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1. 
POSSIBLE US COUNTERVAILING ACTION AGAINST REMISSION 
OF VAT ON E.C. EXPORTS 
(Communication f~om the Commission to the Council) 
The Commission draws attention to this issue for its far-rea~hing economic 
and political implications and invites the Council to share its analysis 
and 'onclusions as set out below. 
The us court case 
2. The Commission believes that a dangerous body of jurisprudence is in the 
making in the US in regard to the remission of indirect taxes to foreign 
exporters. On the basis of US countervailing duty legislation dating 
back to 1897, a US customs court has recently ruled against the rebate 
of the Japanese commodity tax ("Zenith" ease>. This Court seems likely 
to build on this precedent when it comes to judge a complaint lodged 
by US Steel against the remission of VAT to EC steel exporters. 
3. The Commission considers that the Community must now .face up to what it 
believes is the serious risk that these customs court decisions would not 
be reversed at a later stage, in the US Customs and Patent Appeals 
Court or even in the US Supreme Court. 
4. The judicial timetable tor the Community casa is still far from clear. 
But a decision against the Community could be reached in the New York 
Customs Court at almost any point between the end of June Cif "summary 
judgement" on the precedent of the "Zenith" decision is granted) and 
the autumn of 1977 Cif the case against the Community is pursued on 
a normal timetable>. From that point, and pending the outcome of 
appeals in the higher courts, US customs appraisement on EC steel 
exports would be withheld. Thereafter, a decision in the Appeals 
Court might be expected at the end of this year or early in 1978; and 
a final decision in the Supreme Court later in 1978. 
The trade at stake 
5. In the event of an adverse final judgement in the US courts, the us 
Treasury will find itself under court order to impose countervailing 
duties (~quivalent to the tax remitted in each individual case) on r~ughly 
a billion dollars worth of EC steel trade. The issue seems unlikely to stop 
there.Indirectly, almost all the Community's trade could be affected by 
reference to the same principle of law, if other protectionist US lobbies 
wished to jump on the band-waggon. 
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6. The trade impact will still be serious enough to warrant concern, 
even if the immediate damage does not go beyond a tempor-ry with• 
holding of customs appraisement. At a time when it is of the 
first importance to restore business confidence, which has suffered 
during the economic recession, the uncertainties created will 
nevertheless further discourage trade; and exporters will be subject 
to costly bonding requirements. 
7. The threat applies not only to the EC and Japan but also to the 
trading world at large. Most US trade partners remit indirect taxes 
on exports. 
The GATT case 
8. The developing US jurisprudence referred to above is in violation of 
GATT Article VI 6 4 and the note to Article XVI. This has been con• 
firmed in the working group set up by the GATT Council to consider 
Japan's complaint in the Zenith case. But the Customs Court's findings 
include the following: " •••• GATT is a trade agreement, which if in 
conflict with the law of Congres ••• , must yield to the Latter." 
9. Under the Trade Act of 1974, the US Administration is ir.structed to t4ke 
action as may be necessary to secure the revision of GATT articles 
with respect to the "treatment of border adjustments for internal taxes 
to redress the disadvantage to countries relying primariLy on direct 
rather than indirect taxes for revenue needs" (Section 121 § a CS>>. 
The US Government attitude 
10. The Treasury has rejected the US Steel complaint as a matter of 
principle and from the ouset. Indeed, the US Government have made it 
clear that they disapprove of such countervailing action against the 
remission of indirect taxes. During President Jenkins' visit to 
Washington in April, President Carter himself indicated his desire to 
see the case settled satisfactorily. 
11. Nevertheless, if defeated in the courts and compelled to leek for 
remedies requiring Congressional consent, the Administration will, 
however, clearly be under pressure to seek some forll of trade-off 
. : . 
involving negotiations on fi&cal border adjustments. 
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The Community attitude 
. 12. It is therefore importent fo~ the Co~munft~ to avoid any ambiguit~ 
as to the nature of the problem. It is not fo~ the US Administration 
to point to the Courts or to the Congress. The incompatibility of us 
domestic law and US international obligations is for the Ur:'lited States 
as such to resolve. The Community does not have to pay a price to 
secure US respect for such obligations. 
13. In particular there can be no question whatsoever of making the 
Community's value-added tax negotiable. 
14. It therefore falls to the American Administration to take the 
necessary remedial action. If this requires fresh US legislation, 
the Community will look to the Administration to start preparing the 
ground accordingly, and in the interval to make use of every available 
procedural device to delay an adverse court decision. 
Contingency planning 
15. Meanwhile the Community must be ready for all contingencies. This is 
no.t to over-dramatize the situation; the Commission indeed remains 
confident in the US Administration's desire to avert the danger. But 
it is clear that, if US countervailing duties are applied to our 
exports, retaliatory measures cannot be avoided, in order to restore the 
I' 
balance of itrade advantages under the rules of the GATT. 
16. The Commiss·ion will therefore be ready to present rapidly to the 
Council whateve·,. detailed proposa.ls the developing situation may 
warrant. T~e Commission will seek an adequate and credible respanse 
' 
in keeping :with the nature of the challenge, which is still 
limited to the field of customs administration; and will wish 
to avoid an escalation of retaliatory measures. (1) 
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17. Whatever efforts the Community and the US may make to keep this 
conflict within reasonable bounds, it is clear that the implementation 
by the US of trade restrictions of such a fundamental character, 
against clearly established international rules could not remain 
without incidence on the pursuit of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
Immediate action 
18. The Community will closely co-ordinate its own efforts with interested 
third countries and in particular with Japan. The Commission has 
established the appropriate links to this effect. 
19. In direct contacts with US decision-makers, a constant effort will 
be made to explain the danger an~ to stimulate preventive action. 
An educational campaign will therefore be launched with the help of 
the Community's information services with a particula~ view to mobili,ing 
US trade lobbies <agricultural a, well as industrial) likely to be 
interested in the avoidance of a major trade conflict. 
Proposal to the Council 
·-
20. The Commission fn~ites the Counc1l to endorse the. foregoing analysis 
and conclusions. ~t wfll submit further communications on thfs subject 
as approprf ate. 
